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IN ThE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
TESSE J. LEAVITT and PHOEBE J 
i EA VI TT 1 his wife , ) ) 
Plaintiff-Appel;an~s, ) 
' 
) 
-vs.- ) 
) 
ELEANOR BLOHM, ) 
) 
Defenda.nt·--Respondent. ) 
) 
-V5.- ) 
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to r~view the facts in detail b~cause there 
apoear to be numerous statements of facts in 
Plaintiffs' brief with which we cannot agree. 
As Plaintiff state! the property in ques-
tion was owned in fee by Forr~st and Renae 
Hancoc~ on December 22, 1955. All documents 
transferring th~ various interests thereafter 
are detailed in Exhibits 12 and 12a, the chart 
A simplified outline is as follows: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Quit 
Claim 
Deed 
-3-
~-------------HANCOCKS 
·-·-·December 22, 1955 (Ex. 1) 
' t f SMITHS 
August , 19 56 (Ex. 2) 
I 
I 
i 
KARTCHNER 
.August 10~ 1956 (In Ex .. 6) 
I Seller's r-Interest---LYNN ~ 
1 
November 10, 
I BLO~ (Def.) 
1956 (In Ex., 
6) 
I 
I 
I 
I 1-10-57 
~ Ex. o, 7, 8 
LEAVITTS 
May 2 7, 1 q 57 (Ex o 9) 
·------ ·--~ 
Aoril 22, KARTCHNER and CUTLER 
1958 Augu~t 9, 1957 (Ex. 10) 
(Ex. 21) t 
LEAVITTS 
l April 22, VIN YARD INVESTMENT ~gOCKS 1 Feb. 15, to 
March lt 1958 
(Ex. 32 J 
LEAVITIS 
co. 
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Leavitts and their assignors were 
de1inquent from and including the September 
payment f0rward. Contrary to their state-
.. nt on pa~e 1, the $600.00 did not apply 
on the principal or interest of the original 
contract, Ex. 1 (Ex. 22 and Ex. 26; testi-
mony of Ramon Child, T. 48, 49). Further-
more, no additional payments were made to 
Hancocks, until $1,500.00 was tendered March 
26, 1957. This was refused by the Hancocks 
as being insufficient to catch up the ac-
count. (Ex. 11. T. 42,43) 
Defendants first payment was due on 
December 10, 1956 (T. 111). Though she 
had some difficulty making her payments, 
in March she oaid sufficient to cover all 
oayments through May, 1957, and the amount 
of $471.67 of the June 10, 1957, pavment 
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(T. 86, 87). 
In the meantime the Hancocka had 
served notice (Ex. 16, received - T. 37) 
aailed out November 8, 1956, on Lynn,Saith~ 
and Kartchner to pay up in five daya or 
quit (T. 35). Although Defendant did not 
receive this notice, she was bound by the 
notice given her predecessors in title and 
occupation. (U. C. A. 1953, Sec. 78-36-7.) 
The Hancocks then filed suit #2148 
(received T. 11) in which Defendant waa a 
party and she was served with Summons on 
March 25, 1957. This action stated that 
the Smith Contract, Ex. 1, was terminated, 
and asked for eviction and treble damages. 
At the time of trial herein, the treble 
damages still hung over Defendant's head. 
On May 27, 1957, the Hancocks, who 
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had apparently given up on Leavitt, now 
entered into a new contract, Ex. Q, with 
Kartchner and Cutler, which declared the 
Smith Contract forfeited. At this 3tage 
Defenda.nt ceased making payments. By 
June 15, 1957, the Smith contract, Ex 1, 
was now delinquent from September, 1956, 
on. or $3,000~00, plus penalties, taxes, 
insurance and attorney fees. 
By assignment dated August 9, 1957, 
Kartchner and Cutler assigned this contract, 
Ex. 9, to Vineyard Investment Corporation 
(Ex. 10) . 
The only payment Kartr:hner and Cutler 
made on this contract was by an automobile 
which turned out to have been stolen and 
was retaken by the owner (T. 76). Only 
one cash payment was made (T. 76) which 
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would apply on the June 25th payment. The 
contract provided a 30 day grace period, 
so on August 25th the contract was in de-
fault. 
In the conversation which Defendant 
had with Mr. Leavitt in August, 1957, (T. 
90) he told her he was straightening things 
up. She told him until she knew everything 
was straight, she wouldn't pay him anything. 
On December 13, 1957, Defendant was 
again sued for eviction and treble damages, 
in action #2207 (T. 90). Upon being advised 
by her attorney that she had no defense, she 
gave up possession of these premises on 
January 21, 1958 (T. 91). 
On February 17, 1958, judgment was 
entered by stipulation in this matter and 
Defendant escaped the threat of attorney 
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~ e~s or t r~bl e or other d a.m11ge~ in t iJ !t 
ac.~.ion. \Se~ file 1n #2207). 
j~tw~en Pebruar, 15th an~ March A' 
19~8, Yin(. yard ... nvestmenr Company conve y .. 'd 
its i ~~ teres t to I he Lea v 1 t t;:) ( Ex. 3 2 , T . 
134), 
PolJow1ng execut1on of a n~w Hanco~k 
Leavitt Cont=act (Ex. 21) on April 2~, 1958 
.. n e L ,.~a v i t t s de f au 1 t e d out en t i r e 1 y , an d 
t he r q u i t c 1 aim d ~ e d of Apr i :~ 2 2 , 1 9 5 8 , 
was duly recorded on rune 27 1 ~58, (Ex. 
12 a ). Case #2 2 3 6 was b r ~ u g n t and E 1 R a.n c h.., 
rorporation was defau ted out in •nat (see 
file). 
Substantia,.ly allot he 3la1e~rr~-rts 
on pages 5, 6 and 7 of PLaint 1 ~~s br1ef 
are erroneou~ or m~rPly ar~umentativ 
The cout:act of November 10, 1956, 
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fixea the value of the Coronado Street 
property, accepted as a down payment from 
Defendant at $5,000.00. Defendant's pay-
ments amounted to $2,721.67. A reasonable 
rental was stipulated to be $200.00 a month, 
or $2,866.67 during the period of occupancy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT~ I AND III 
As to Plaintiff's contention that the 
trial Court erred in denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and/or judgment 
on the pleadings and that the Court erred 
in entering judgment for Defendant on her 
counterclaim. 
I will discuss these points together 
since the issues raised are almost identical. 
When Plaintiffs acquired Lynn's seller's 
interest in the Blohm contract there can 
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be no question that they stood in her 
shoes aa to the Defendant and were obli-
~ated to keep the payments up to the fee 
title holder and not permit the contract 
to be defaulted and the Defendant ousted. 
Plaintiffs cite 55 AM. JUR. (Vendor 
and Purchaser) Sec. 601 for the general 
rule that the Vendee must first tender 
payment before the Vendor can be in de-
fault. It should be noted that the last 
two sentences are to the following effect: 
"However, even though the vendor's 
promise is conditioned upon payment 
by the purchaser of the purcha8e 
price, there may be an obligation to 
perform and a breach upon the part 
of the vendor without payment or 
tender of pa-yment by the purchaser 
where payment or tender of payment 
would be useless, as ~e the vendor 
is unable or refuses to perform. 
Accordingly, where performance or 
tender of performance by the vendee 
would be useless, the vendee need not 
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peL~orm or tender performance in 
order to re8cind for a breach of 
the vendor." 
s ... c Lion 602, however, is even more 
p~~if1c. I quote: 
. where there is a defect in or 
want of title which the vendor cannot 
or will not remedy within the time 
allowed for conveyance and perfection 
of title even if payment or tender 
of payme·n t is made, such ::!ef ec t in or 
want of title may be a breach of th~ 
executory contract which warrants re-
S\-:ission even though payment is neither 
made nor tendered; in such a case 
the purchaser need not perform or 
tender in order to rescind because of 
the defect in or want of title, it 
bPing assumed that the defect in or 
~~rant of title is such as to warrant 
~escission if the purchaser performs 
or tenders. This rulP has been applied 
where th~ vendor'8 title was subject 
to an easem~nt, to a mortgage or other 
lien, and to an outstanding lease. 
This rule has also been applied where 
the vendor had no title to a portion 
of the premises wh~re the vendor'• 
title h&s b~en terminated by fore-
closure of a mortgage or ~ien, and 
where title was in a th1rd person and 
was not within the contro~ of the 
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vendor. If a vendor has disabled 
himself to convey such titl~ as 
he has contracted to convey, the 
purchaser's right of rescission is 
complete without an offer by the 
purchaser to perform. It has been 
held in a number of cases that where 
the vendor, by reason of having con-
veyed the property to another, is 
unable to perform, an offer to pay 
the balance of the purchase money is 
unnecessary." 
This doctrine is spelled out in 40 
A. L. R. at page 700. The note indicates 
that tender is dispensed with where title 
of vendor has been terminated by foreclosure 
of a mortgage. In the instant case the 
fee title holders had declared the contract 
under which Plaintiffs held to be terminated. 
After ~orne further maneuvering Plaintiffs 
were foreclosed of all interest in the 
property. 
To like effect is 59 A. L. R. at page 
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250. I quote: 
'There may be circumstances 
which will juetify the vendee in 
refusing further to perform, and 
enable him to recover the amount 
he has paid on the purchase price, 
although the time fixed for per-
formance by the vendor has not yet 
arrived. Thus, it has been held 
that, where the only title the 
vendor had to the land he had con-
tracted to sell was as a vendee in 
an executory contract for its pur-
chase, and he made default in this 
contract, and it was foreclosed, 
and the land was sold and purchased 
by a third person, this constituted 
such a complete change in the title 
as entitled the vendee to rescind 
and recover the amount he had paid 
on the purchase price. Girratano 
v. Mcilwain (1926) 215 App. Div. 
644, 214 N. Y. Supp. 582." 
The most specific note is found in 
109 A. L. R. 242. I quote from page 243: 
" . . . whereas if the vendor had an 
apparent, and, to some extent at least, 
a valid, title, at the time of con-
tracting, the vendee may with some 
reason urge that in entering into the 
agreement to purchase he relied upon, 
or at least assumed, the existence 
of potential ownership in the vendor, 
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and that, conceding he may not com· 
plain of defect 3 ''I' encumbrance~ 
which are within the ~ower of the 
vendot: in due time to remove., he 
~hou!d not be expected to proceed 
with the contract where the fact 
develops that there are defects or 
encumbrance$ the removal of which 
rest~ upon mere hope and conjecture, 
a8 where, in the acquisition of 
title, the vendor must necesssu i 1 y 
be wholly dependent upon the w411 
and volition of a third party.) 
Many cases in support of the cl~,...trine 
are noted on page 2510 
In the instant case we not only have 
the institution of foreclosure p ocee~dings 
unde.r which the vendor ultimatr·Jy !o~t •• t,e, 
but these additiona1 factor5! 
.~ .. ~ The fee title owners re-sold to 
Cutler and Kart~hner and, 
B. D~ring t~e entire time from the 
filing cf the first action till De-
fetdant va~ated the premises she was 
in peril of having •reb 1 e damage~ 
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aasessed against her. This question is 
included in the pre-trial order in case 
#2148. and. we submit, was a real threat. 
These factors are assessed in the portion 
of the last mentioned A. L. R. note. See 
Metcalfe v. Dallam 4 Ky. 196 and Liveridge 
v. Cples 72 Minn. 57~ 74 N. W. 1109, bri@fed 
on o. 263. The nnte then ci+es an application 
of +he princiole by our court. I quote from 
oage 263: 
" ...• a vendee, when sued 
for an instalment coming due prior 
to the tjme set for conveyance, 
may well defend that the vendor 
is insolvent, that he is not, as the 
vendee had supposed, the absolute 
owner of the premises, but himself 
holds merely an executory contract 
to purchase the same, together with 
other lands, and is in default there-
under, and that the vendee has de-
clined to make payment merely be-
cause he fears that his payments will 
be lost, and is willing to make pay-
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ment when it can be safely made to 
some person in a position to carry 
out the vendor's contract. Such at 
least is the rule where the action is 
brought in a court having equity ju-
rildiction. Tremonton Invest. Co. v. 
Horne (1921) 5~ Utah, 156, 202 P. 527." 
The Tremonton case varies slightly 
from our case, but certainly equity has 
a strong purpose in intervening on behalf 
of the Defendant here. On june 15th the 
Plaintiffs were $3,000.00 behind, new owners 
held the contract and it certainly would not 
have been prudent for Defendant to go on 
pouring her payments down the hole. 
True, a corporation in which Plaintiffs 
held a large interest did re-acquire the 
May 27th contract in August, but not even 
then, nor till after Defendant vacated did 
Plaintiffs take title in their own names. 
During that period Plaintiffs had the capacity 
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to perform as to Doferdant if they wanted 
to, but she had no capac1ty to require them 
t o o ~ r f o r m .. I n o t he r wo .,.. d s , if t h e y r an 
across a better deal, r .. neyard Investment 
Company could ;u~t a~ easily have entered 
into a contract witn a third party. 
In th~ conversation in mid-August 
\,eavi tt told D~f end ant h~ was stra.ightening 
thi"lgs oute She said she would pay nothing 
tnl~ss t~tey got the matter straightened 
out. He made no effort to do this or t·-
set her mind at rest. The next thing that 
happen~d was the filing of #2207. Could 
Defendant be blamed for giving up in despair 7 
It is not reasonable to expect her t.J con-
tinue to run the risk of treble damag~s 
under #2J48, which was stil~ pending, wh~le 
these maneuvers went on. 
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Plaintiffs urge upon the Court a rule 
of damages which I submit is unsound. The 
correct rule is set forth in the Utah case 
of McBride vp Stewart, 68 Utah 14 249 Pac. 
114, 48 A. L. R. 267. I quote from the 
opinion: 
" . . • the injured party has an 
election to pursue one of three 
remedies: 1. He may treat the 
contract as rescinded and recover 
upon quantum meruit so far a5 he 
has performed, or 2. He may keep 
the contract alive for the benefit 
of both parties, being at all times 
himself ready and able to perform 
and at the end of the time specified 
in the contract for performance, sue 
and recover under the contract, or 
3. He may treat the repudiation as 
putting an end to the contract for 
all purposes of performance and sue 
for the profits he would have realized 
if he had not been prevented from 
performing." 
In our case, we have treated the con-
tract as rescinded and are suing for what 
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the Defendant paid less he rea5onab e 
rental value of the prem1ses, th• f1rst 
alternative ~ta.ted above. i',lis rule ~s 
also announced 1r1 McK~ llar Real Estate and 
Investment Compa:n~ v .,_P~, 62, Utah 97, 
?.]8 Pac. 128. 
Tne contract between ynn and Defendant 
f1xed thP value of the Coronado Srr~et 
prope~ty at $~,ooo~oc_ An inquiry into 
the rela~ive values of the pr~perties ;s 
~rre evant and is an at~empt to varv the 
term5 of a llt'T;tten agreement with utterly 
no bas~s to do so. 
tion of h~ re" a ive val1es o th~ p oper ties 
was nut raised, nur was tne amount uf the 
down pa.trrit:TlL cue:s-+-~uued by the p 1 ~ading:5 
vr (1urin~ 'te pre--tr1a1 cvnfeL·en '"',nor 
a.. an 'Y -:- 1m""' p ~ u r to t r .: a J 7 and f u 1 t h 1 ~ 
rea~ on was pr0per 1 y exc 1 1dea from cons id 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-20-
at ion .. 
POINT II 
As to Plaintiffs contention that they 
should have been allowed to amend to show 
that Defendant had removed certain personal 
property from the premises. Plaintiffs 
preaented this proposal at the start of 
trial, although many months had elapsed 
since suit was filed, depositions had been 
taken and pre-trial was complete (T. 1). 
Prom Mr~ Puller's statement it appears 
that the property he is talking about 
originally belonged to Mrs. Lynn, was not 
a part of the inventory and did not ever 
become the property of the Plaintiffs (T. 
6, 7). This is why he denied that it should 
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have been a part of nis case in cl ief, i. E • 
u converted proper+y. rhus :tn e+fe~~ P'!_a~n 
tiffs are say1ng 9 'You to~k prope~ty which 
a th\rc1 person ~eft on the J)rf!lll'ise:s, and 
so we are entitled to a oenefit c~~m :he 
value you received"'~ 
As the trial ccurt poi.n ~ed out, Lynn 
hei·self would be thr~ one to r:~laim e1m-
·JuJ·sement if the property were ~ aken by 
Defendant (T. 7). Mr., Fuller even conceded 
thil.i. she might claim payment for ~.t (T. 7). 
vf ~ourse, we donrt concede that the prope tr 
wa:s ·~ot ~>aid f o J. • H.owev~ c. even admi 1 i 1ng 
tnat is a que~t:t on of fact, pr.oper.t., belong n~ 
to ;ynn which we rnig1t have tak~>·n, would 
not entitle Plain•1f&s to a cre!i• against 
da.mages owed us. 
I a 1 so wan t t L~ p o in t > u t t ti at the · e 
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never wa~ any~hing before the Court. Mr. 
Full~r mereLy asKed the Court f:)r a ru·1n, 
a;l) t ·) the breadt-h of part icu ~ ar rna t t e rs 
in the pre-trial order (T. 1). He ne~er 
,jid a~!k any question about this, which 
mi5'1t ht.v«• been the basis for a r 'tl ing 
on ~s relevancy. 
CONCLUSICN 
'l'lle judgment of the •rial cour should 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMI ~~'LEU, 
GI EN M.. -I~TCI1 
Defendant RP s JOI dent 
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